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The Specificity of American Higher Education  
 
Leaders of Norwegian higher education—in common with others in the Nordic 
countries and to varying degrees around Europe—have lately been urged to 
“Americanize” their institutions. Just what this might mean is often unclear; perhaps the 
most common thread of meaning is simply that those who control government purse 
strings wish to foot less of the bill. There are also suggestions that European universities 
might become more “productive,” either in research or teaching.  
My task here is not to assess the merits of these proposals, but to make more 
explicit some features of the American higher education system for the sake of clearer 
comparison. I will not provide an exhaustive description, let alone a detailed analysis. 
Aside from establishing a basis for more precise comparison, I want to suggest three 
significant points. First, American approaches to and institutions for higher education are 
extremely diverse. There is no single American model. Second, focusing especially on the 
research universities that are perhaps most similar to European counterparts, I want to 
suggest that the American approach to higher education involves a system. This should be 
obvious to social scientists but sometimes is not obvious to policy-makers. The system 
does not reflect a rational design or function perfectly, but its various parts are 
interdependent. One of the problems with some proposals to “Americanize” European 
higher education is that they propose to lift certain features out of the complex whole, for 
example to achieve American-style emphasis on faculty productivity without creating 
American-style job markets.  
After establishing some of the general characteristics that distinguish the 
American system of higher education, I will take up a third point. The U.S. system has 
undergone recurrent structural transformations and is in the midst of one of these now. 
Many debates about American colleges and universities are less productive than they 
might be because they neglect transformations in the character of specific institutions and 
the sociology of the overall field of higher education. This is particularly true of a recent 
wave of critiques that approach curricular change without attention to structural 
transformations (often exaggerating not only the influence of the academic left, but the 
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extent to which what goes on at the most elite institutions sets the model for the whole 
system). 1  
Of course, some of the criticisms do hit home. Colleges and universities do have 
problems with accountability, with maintaining appropriate reward structures, and with 
motivating and reviewing faculty after the tenure stage. Doubts about how well 
undergraduates are served are eminently reasonable. So too are questions about whether 
all the research produced is valuable. It is more than just possible that there are problems 
with the internal governance systems (and external regulatory regimes) that have 
produced rapidly rising costs and swelling cadres of administrative staff. A striking 
feature of both the criticisms and the self-analyses and defenses of educators and 
administrators, however, is that they are cast at a very general level. They do not focus 
with adequate seriousness on the differences in mission and nature that distinguish 
America’s colleges and universities. Likewise, they are commonly historically naïve, 
operating with reference to an unspecified “golden age” when classes were small and all 
taught by the best faculty, when students were attentive and all found good jobs on 
graduation, and when the content of courses was at once intellectually stimulating and 
universally inoffensive. 
Though the golden age is mythical, American higher education has indeed been 
powerfully transformed in the postwar era.  First, the field grew enormously. Second, the 
balance and relationships among different types of institutions were altered during this 
expansion. Third, the balance shifted also among teaching, scholarship, and research as 
basic components of academic work. These changes were linked, and each mattered 
greatly. Without comprehending these changes, it is impossible to give sensible answers 
to questions about the place and quality of teaching in today’s schools.2 
                                                 
1 See, among many, Bloom (1987), D’Souza (1991), Kimball (1990), Smith (1990), Sykes (1990). These 
(and other) major book-length critiques launched a wave of investigations and attacks from foundations and 
local interest groups. Articles appeared in a range of publications for policy makers, legislators, and the 
general public. The peak phase of the attacks—like that of the “culture wars” and rebellion against a 
changing literary canon with which both were associated—had passed by the late 1990s. Repercussions 
continue, however, as do efforts to accommodate the criticisms in policy reforms. See, for example, the 
criticism of the City University of New York and attack on open access higher education in Schmidt, et al, 
(1999). 
2 See Calhoun (1999a, b) and more generally Pescasolido and Aminzade, eds. (1999). For a general 
historical account, see Cohen (1998).  
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Distinctive Features of American Higher Education 
American higher education is a complex system. When comparisons are made to 
higher education in other countries, it is important to recognize the nature of the overall 
system. Among other things, attempting to emulate specific organizational features 
without considering their relationship to the overall system is a potential source of 
problems and disappointments. More systematic comparative research would be helpful.3 
The present effort is limited to summarizing several of the basic systemic factors that 
make U.S. higher education distinctive. 
 
Institutional differentiation.  No single feature of American higher education is 
more distinctive than its very diversity of institutions. Research universities, multi-branch 
state university systems, undergraduate liberal arts colleges, technical institutes, career-
oriented colleges, two-year community and junior colleges, universities wholly-owned by 
corporations and still more different kinds of institutions mingle in the broad field of 
American higher education. It is hard to generalize accurately. 
Indeed, one kind of inaccurate generalization plays a significant ideological role.  
Americans tend to view bachelor’s degrees as a more or less homogeneous achievement, 
underestimating the status and labor market differences among them. However, the 
contributions to future income and class position made by different sorts of degrees from 
different kinds of institutions vary enormously. Coleman and Rainwater (1978) studied 
the impact of college graduation on lifetime earnings potential (from paid employment, 
that is, already putting aside the question of where those with inherited wealth went to 
gain education commensurate with that wealth). The 15% of students who attended the 
country’s most elite private institutions could expect to earn 84% more on average than 
those who had not graduated from college. The 45% who attended the next tier of still 
somewhat selective private colleges and leading state university campuses could expect 
an earnings boost of 52%.  But, those who graduated from the rest of the country’s 
colleges and universities could expect, on average, no net earnings gain compared to 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., work such as Rothblatt and Wittrock (1993) though the emphasis is on earlier periods.  
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those who didn’t complete college. The differences remained significant even when 
controlled for father’s education, race, and region. 
This pattern has changed in two crucial respects (though there is no new study 
with comparable data to document changes precisely). First, the gap between the average 
earnings of college graduates and the rest of the population has widened. This is a result 
of both credentialism and of the disappearance of well-paid (especially unionized) manual 
jobs in favor of often poorly paid service sector work. This means that less prestigious 
colleges may pay off better than before compared to failure to attend college.4 Second, 
however, there has been an increasing inequality in earnings of college graduates which 
has increased the advantage of elite education compared to non-elite. This operates 
independently of choice of major (though of course some majors also result in higher 
earnings; Kominski 1990). Rewards flow very disproportionately to those at the top of 
most lines of work (Frank and Cook 1995). These top positions go disproportionately to 
graduates of about ten percent of America’s colleges and universities (and indeed, 
disproportionately to the most prestigious within that ten percent). The shift away from 
educating elites—either those of inherited position or those who aspired to become elites 
through entering learned professions—has thus happened in most of the higher education 
sector, but not in its most prestigious institutions. 
Beyond status differences, course, there are also different niches, mandates and 
missions. Some colleges are 100% residential, others house none of their students. Some 
enroll mainly 18-22 year olds, others cater heavily to adult students. Some specialize in 
specific fields, others offer a wide variety. Probably the biggest distinction is between 
schools that emphasize “general liberal arts education” and those that specialize in 
terminal bachelor’s degrees in direct preparation for specific careers. This reflects a long-
standing (but recently accelerated) pattern in American higher education. Many 
“practical” subjects that were not taught in universities in Europe have been important to 
colleges and universities in the U.S. Since the Civil War, many universities have had this 
as a central part of their mission. These have ranged from elite private institutions like the 
                                                 
4 Research is needed on this point. It seems likely that if tendencies toward polarization of the labor market 
continue, the extent to which degrees from nonselective colleges will qualify graduates for “middle class” 
jobs will decline.  
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Cornell University (both founded in 1865) to 
the broad range of public universities supported in part by federal land grants following 
the Morrill Act of 1862. Technical education in agriculture, engineering, and a variety of 
other fields, thus, has long been the province of American universities.  
In many cases, however, technical training was combined with “liberal arts” 
education—a broad, general education in philosophy, history, literature, rhetoric, and 
science. Many American colleges and universities were founded with a focus on training 
members of the clergy, and this sort of training joined with theology as part of the core of 
their studies. As the teaching of law became more dominated by universities, it was based 
on similar foundations. But the pattern came to be to expect students concentrating in 
nearly all fields of study to devote approximately half of their undergraduate educations 
to study outside their primary field of study. This set a pattern for the combination of a 
“major” with “general education” that remains distinctive of America.  
From the late 19th century, it became normal for majors to be identified with the 
kinds of research subjects and scholarly fields that formed the basis for PhD degrees—
specific sciences, social sciences, or humanities disciplines. Concomitantly, it became 
increasingly common for professional education—especially in the most elite 
professions—to be organized through postgraduate degrees. Medicine, dentistry, law, and 
theology were all organized this way by the early 20th century. Increasingly, other fields 
seeking professional status followed suit, including both education and business, though 
in neither case did graduate degrees become as exclusively predominant as in the older 
elite professions. The result was that the normative undergraduate education in the US 
was conceived as a broad sort of preparation appropriate not simply to a gentleman or a 
citizen (though these ideals informed the pattern) but to someone who would gain 
specific career skills through a postgraduate degree. Thus a future lawyer might study 
political science as an undergraduate major, a future physician biology, a future minister 
philosophy, and so forth. This conception of the liberal arts degree coexisted with 
provision of first professional degrees, sometimes in the same institution.  
Predictably, however, institutional differentiation was common. It took two main 
forms. First, in universities the teaching of liberal arts and science subjects was 
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commonly organized through a “College of Arts and Science” or similar unit. This was 
typically closely related to the graduate teaching of research fields. Over time, 
professional schools in a growing range of fields have been added to the original arts and 
science core of most universities. It is now common for the professional schools to award 
a majority of all degrees—especially postgraduate degrees--in major universities. In 
addition, the professional schools have often claimed a growing autonomy within the 
universities and have been successful in raising greater funding than the arts and sciences 
(both by charging fees for specialized courses and by soliciting gifts from benefactors 
with an interest in their specific fields of work). Once basic to the conception of the 
university, the arts and science fields are now in many cases minority pursuits 
concentrated in one or two specialized colleges within the larger university. Even where 
liberal arts subjects enroll a majority of students, the proportionate power of and budget 
for professional schools has increased. 
Second, many American colleges chose not to become universities, offering 
neither research degrees such as the PhD nor professional degrees. They specialized in the 
liberal arts (including science). Indeed, independent “liberal arts colleges” are among the 
most distinctive American institutions of higher education (with some historical pedigree 
in Oxford and Cambridge but minimal analog elsewhere). Many of these schools were 
founded by religious denominations, or by individual philanthropists who commonly 
mandated a religious orientation, but a large percentage have become secular. Most of the 
liberal arts colleges date from the 19th century or earlier, but some continued to be 
founded well into the 20th century.  
Recent years have seen a substantial decline in the number of liberal arts 
colleges.5 While community colleges and large universities grew during the 1960s and 
70s and gained substantial new resources, most liberal arts colleges did not. This left 
many vulnerable when the economic and demographic environment grew less favorable 
during the 1980s.  
                                                 
5 How steep the decline has been depends on the definition one uses. Between 1970 and 1987, there was a 
decline from about 715 to 570 in the number of private, independent four-year schools (Carnegie 
Commission, 1987). Most of this was due to reclassification, as many grew large and came to be 
incorporated into universities. Quite a few others simply closed their doors. 
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Those colleges that remained small and autonomous were divided into two groups 
by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. The first—about 140 of the total--
consisted basically of those that offered primarily liberal arts bachelors’ degrees and were 
more or less highly selective in admissions. Prestigious examples include Amherst, 
Carleton, Reed, and Williams. These schools were also often relatively well endowed 
financially, and in any case are able to attract students willing to pay high tuition because 
of the educational experiences they offer (curricular and extracurricular) and their success 
in placing students in graduate and professional schools.  
The second group of liberal arts colleges had offered a similar mix of degrees 
historically, but were generally not very selective in admissions and had much lesser 
financial resources. A key result was that they came into direct competition with what the 
Carnegie Commission calls “comprehensive universities and colleges,” particularly the 
less selective branch campuses of public university systems but also a number of 
relatively small private universities. Competition over tuition costs was debilitating to 
many small colleges, as students and their families chose less expensive public 
institutions or attended private ones only when they could get financial assistance. More 
transformative, however, was competition over courses of study. The less selective small 
colleges moved away from their traditional emphasis on the liberal arts, adding more and 
more courses and majors in business and other directly job-related fields. As Breneman 
(1990) puts it, most of what have commonly been called liberal arts colleges transformed 
themselves into ‘small, professional college[s]’. Breneman estimates, in fact, that no 
fewer than 317 of what had been liberal arts colleges stopped granting even 40 percent of 
their degrees in liberal arts subjects. This reduced the total number of “real” liberal arts 
colleges from 540 to 212.6 
This was one dramatic institutional manifestation of the general rise in popularity 
of professional, career-oriented baccalaureate programs. This combined with the growth 
of community colleges to mean that the majority of students in American higher 
                                                 
6 Breneman’s figure of 540 small colleges (before deducting those no longer classifiable as liberal arts 
schools) is slightly lower than the Carnegie Commission’s because of differences in classification. A 
common criticism is that some such colleges teach material that should be taught in high school. A 
somewhat oblique support for this comes in Arum’s (1998) finding that states that spend more on high 
school vocational programs spend less on college level ones, and vice versa. 
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education—and the majority of those taking sociology classes—was no longer comprised 
of liberal arts students. The bulk of the public debate about changes in higher education 
since the 1960s, however, continued to center on an image of “liberal arts” education. It is 
in this context that pundits have debated whether ‘political correctness’ has changed the 
teaching of history, whether ‘tenured radicals’ have dominated the social sciences and 
humanities, and whether poststructuralist theory has driven out the proper teaching of 
literature. Whatever the merits of such charges, the debate has missed—indeed, 
obscured—the much more basic changes brought about by the rise of career-oriented, 
non-liberal arts higher education. Liberal arts degrees are now clearly a minority pursuit 
and mainly an elite one. Considerations of the future of American higher education (and 
comparisons of it to that in other countries) need to be clear about this and analyze its 
implications. 
To sum up, it is important to keep in mind both very high levels of inequality (in 
resources as well as student abilities and prestige) and wide differences in mission and 
institutional character. 
 
Scale.  Behind the diversity of institutions lies the sheer scale of American higher 
education. More than 65% of American youth at least start college, and close to two 
thirds of those eventually graduate. Well over a million bachelor’s degrees are granted 
each year, more than 400,000 master’s degrees, and some 43,000 PhDs. There are nearly 
a million full-time college professors in the US (National Center for Educational 
Statistics, 1996, 1997; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1998). 
This represents a dramatic growth during the 20th century. The most dramatic 
phase of growth in the system came after World War II. Over half the colleges and 
universities operating in the U.S. today did not even exist before the War (Lucas 1996: 
12). The pattern of growth is, however, longstanding and deeply woven into American 
expectations for democracy, culture, and above all social mobility. Growth was more or 
less continuous until the 1980s, when a combination of economics, demographics, and 
politics brought it to an end, and even produced some retrenchment. It is worth 
considering current struggles over the curriculum (e.g., the “canon wars”), and over 
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“market-driven” higher education against the background of earlier changes that 
accompanied the expansion of the system. 
Fewer than 3% of the nation’s population at the close of the 19th century had ever 
attended college, let alone graduated. A pattern of rapid growth was already underway at 
the turn of the century, but it was only after World War II that higher education really 
became a mass phenomenon in the US. Returning veterans supported by special 
government funding (the GI Bill) flooded American colleges and universities, helping to 
spark expansion even in relatively hard times. On a smaller scale, the same thing 
happened after the Korean War. But more dramatically, the veterans of both wars (and 
their generational cohorts) produced a sustained baby boom. This, combined with 
economic growth and advancing technology, led to an explosion in demand for higher 
education during the 1960s. New colleges and universities were founded and existing 
ones expanded. In 1947, there were 2.3 million students in U.S. colleges and universities, 
up from 1.5 million before the War; by 1994, the number was 14.2 million. The 
proportion of young adults graduating from high school rose from less than 7% at the turn 
of the century to half at the end of World War II, peaked at 77% in 1968-69, and though it 
has fallen back remains over 71%. The proportion of these high school graduates going 
on to college rose from 45% in 1960 to 65% (exclusive of vocational and trade schools) 
in the mid-1990s. Some 43% of high school graduates go to 4-year schools and another 
22% to 2-year colleges. Well over a million bachelor’s degrees are granted each year. To 
offer these higher levels of education, the number of faculty grew from 246,000 in 1949-
50 to nearly a million today. Graduate education grew commensurately. As late as 1920, 
only 615 PhDs were awarded in the US. Today more than 43,000 are awarded each year 
(US Bureau of the Census, 1976; National Center for Educational Statistics, 1996, 1997). 
Both the educational meaning and job market value of college degrees changed, as did the 
relationship of higher education to social class and social policy.   
This story of growth has profound but surprisingly often overlooked implications. 
To start with, between the 1940s and 1990s, students became more diverse, less 
exclusively upper and middle class, more commonly immigrants and members of 
minority groups. Of at least equal importance, however, they are not in any similar 
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aggregate sense an elite. Neither is a college degree training them for membership in an 
elite. A college degree is increasingly standard—at least for the middle class--rather than 
a mark of distinction. Having one only sets one apart from a little more than half of one’s 
generation. As we know from studies of credentialism, college diplomas are increasingly 
required for positions that were earlier held by high school graduates or even dropouts 
(Collins, 1979). This does not in itself mean that students gain only the same level of 
education in college that previous generations gained in high school (a common but false 
assumption). Today’s college students learn a great deal. There is, however, as we noted 
above, a bifurcation between liberal arts majors and students whose first degrees are 
directly and narrowly career-oriented.  
The largest part of this growth has come in public institutions. As Oakley (1992: 
79) sums up, “Almost 90 percent of the institutions enrolling more than 10,000 students 
are public, whereas 87 percent of those enrolling 1,000 or fewer are private”. The very 
large public university—Ohio State or the University of Minnesota—accounts for part of 
this growth. Many state universities have metastasized into systems with several 
campuses each enrolling 10,000 or more students. Often one or two of these are seen as 
flagship research institutions, but there is common governance and funding for the whole 
system. The most rapidly growing subsector has not been big state universities, however, 
but two-year institutions (community or junior colleges). These have expanded 
dramatically to account for nearly 40% of total U.S. enrollments. Some of their programs 
are geared towards students who will transfer to universities or four-year colleges, but 
most are more immediately aimed at career needs (see discussion in Brint and Karabel 
1988). 
In short, American higher education needs to be understood as a very large 
system. It serves a substantial majority of the population and does it through a complex 
and increasingly differentiated range of institutions. The connections among these 
different kinds of institutions are often problematic, but nonetheless they do tie each to 
the system as a whole. To abstract one kind of institution from this context is to miss 
ways in which each depends on or is shaped by the broader system. A simply example is 
the extent to which research universities depend on graduate students for both teaching 
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and research labor, as well as for enrollment. The graduate student population is made 
possible, however, partly by the existence of a job market for college teachers in the rest 
of the system. Shifts in this market have dramatic implications for research universities. 
 
Role of private money.  From a European point of view, the substantial role of 
private funding is also a crucial feature of American higher education. This appears 
distinctively in the range of private colleges and universities. Most of these are 
established as not-for-profit organizations, commonly with distinctive state charters, and 
almost always with exemptions from taxes. An increasing number, however, are (or are 
owned by) for-profit companies. The proportion of private institutions is greater towards 
the more prestigious end of the American system, with the elite liberal arts colleges and 
the top tier of research universities. Private institutions exist at all levels, however, even 
though the percentage of students enrolled in them is smaller at the lower end. It is also 
important to note that public institutions receive a good deal of private money. Major 
state research universities like the University of Michigan receive substantial state 
support, but the majority of the annual budgets of many is actually paid from private 
sources (including tuition, foundation grants, alumni and other gifts, sports revenues, and 
research contracts with business corporations).  
Benefactions from wealthy individuals and families are central to private support. 
The amounts involved are quite large: in the last five years, Harvard University has 
received an additional $2.3 billion in gifts to add to its already large endowment. While 
Harvard is distinctive, all major research universities in America—including those owned 
and operated by states--have private endowments of at least several hundred million 
dollars. So do perhaps thirty colleges whose missions focus overwhelmingly on 
undergraduate education. In addition, privately funded foundations (e.g., the Ford 
Foundation, the Mellon Foundation) are major sources of financial support for research 
and sometimes for the development of new academic programs. Their combined inputs 
into university budgets far outstrips that of the National Science Foundation.  
The payment of tuition and fees is also important. The cost of attending an elite 
private college or university is now about $25,000, simply for tuition payments, not 
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including housing, food, or incidental purchases such as books. Even at state-funded 
universities tuition for in-state students commonly exceeds $5000 per year and for out-of-
state students runs up to three times that. Scholarships and other financial support are 
available for many students (most of a need-adjusted basis, some on ‘merit’ or 
competitive bases). Two critical variables distinguishing institutions are the extent to 
which they must ‘discount’ their tuition costs with financial aid to fill their student rolls, 
and the extent to which they can afford to use scholarships to keep the overall quality of 
their student bodies (and indirectly their institutional prestige) high. While the nominal 
tuition for graduate students is comparable, in most reputable PhD programs few graduate 
students pay full tuition and most have it waived entirely and are paid modest stipends 
from fellowships or in compensation for work as teaching assistants. Master’s degree 
programs are often significant revenue sources for colleges and universities.7 Some of 
these are applied degrees oriented to specific careers (e.g., the MBA). Many others have 
come under criticism for being poorly thought-out intermediaries between undergraduate 
and PhD education; they persist in part because of the tuition revenue they bring in. In 
most schools, however, it is undergraduate tuition that contributes most importantly to 
overall budgets. What students and their families purchase with these payments is not 
only teaching but prestige. The higher tuitions at research universities help to purchase 
the intellectual reputations of faculty members who may actually devote a minority of 
their time—sometimes none—to teaching undergraduates.  
                                                 
7 Relying on specific programs for revenue to subsidize others is common in American universities and the 
pattern of cross-subsidies produces predictable tensions. Those units that produce the revenues would like 
to control more of them. The rationale for the transfer of funds is commonly that the overall institutional 
mandate (and prestige) is served by expensive fields that produce lower revenue. In addition, the revenue-
producing programs (which include extension divisions as well as professional schools and occasionally 
specific arts and science departments) employ the university’s “brand name” when marketing their 
programs; the cross-subsidies are in a sense a payment for this or at least an investment in it. Thus, schools 
of education often enroll more students per unit of faculty cost than liberal arts programs, partly because of 
the research investments of the latter. They thus subsidize arts and science faculties. This produces not only 
resentments within education faculties, but a pressure to admit large numbers of fee-paying students. This in 
turn makes it harder to raise the quality of education programs by making them more selective or (as many 
have argued should be the case) by requiring that future teachers have arts and science undergraduate 
majors supplemented by pedagogical training. As a result of the disparity in admissions standards (and a 
perceived disparity in faculty research, itself influenced by the resources made available), arts and science 
faculty who are beneficiaries of the subsidies often look down on the education faculty who produce it.  
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Gifts and tuition payments have traditionally accounted for the vast majority of 
private money in American education. An increasing role is being played, however, by 
corporate purchases and investments. Contract research has a long history, as university 
faculty undertake specific projects for companies. Most of the proceeds of this have 
flowed to the faculty and their research programs, though in recent decades universities 
have become more adept at recovering parts of it for their overhead budgets. Corporations 
have also made gifts from which they derived some business benefits—naming buildings, 
lecture series, or fellowship programs, for example—but these have been only modestly 
different from other sorts of gifts. Similarly, colleges and universities decades ago began 
to market their “brands” in cooperation with private businesses—selling Harvard 
sweatshirts, for example, and University of Florida sunglasses. This has extended to 
profit-sharing agreements in the provision of food to students, the selling of books, the 
operating of housing facilities, and other areas.  
More dramatic changes, however, come with major investments in scientific 
research. Private, for-profit firms have entered into business arrangements that build 
scientific laboratories and pay for research. A very rapidly growing proportion of 
scientific research in the US is conducted through partnerships between universities and 
private corporations. The infusions of money into universities are enormous. In some 
cases, such as that reached between the University of California at Berkeley and the 
Novartis Corporation, whole departments are committed to integrate their research 
programs with those of their capitalist sponsors. Sometimes these sponsors own or claim 
proprietary control over this research; other times they simply have right of first refusal 
on any inventions or discoveries that may have market value. This raises a variety of 
questions. How does it affect academic freedom? How does it shape the relations between 
units of universities that receive such funding and those (commonly in the liberal arts and 
sciences) that do not? Not least of all, does it portend (along with the rise in corporate 
research) an end to the distinctive American pattern of locating most scientific research in 
universities and seeking to keep it closely related to teaching? 
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Location of research in universities.  The location of most scientific research in 
universities is among the major distinctions of the American higher education system 
from many others (including in varying degree those in Europe). While there are research 
institutes operated by the US government, these operate in a relatively small number of 
fields and conduct a small minority of research. There have been American proposals for 
a nationally operated scientific research establishment—most notably after World War 
Two. These were defeated, however, in favor of decentralization into the universities. 
Federal funding was deemed acceptable, close federal direction was not. In effect, 
American universities adopted the German model in the late 19th century, and then took it 
further. In the U.S., university based research was never complemented to comparable 
degree by an organization like the Max Planck Society, let alone France’s CNRS.8 
The location of research in universities introduced various complexities. First, it 
created a need for funds and helped to encourage an orientation towards gaining external 
funds. Universities providing space and faculty for research, as well as administrative 
services, began to demand “indirect cost recovery”. These overhead charges became an 
important part of university budgets. While some of the funds received were closely 
related to the actual administration of research, or returned to the investigators for their 
continued work, administrators also drew on overhead income to subsidize other projects. 
Secondly, the location of research in universities created hybrid institutions.9 The 
two signs of prestige for American universities through most of the 20th century were (a) 
emphasis on liberal arts degrees, and (b) research performance. If tradition placed the 
former first, the second has grown more rapidly in importance. While some faculty are 
hired exclusively as research professors, this is uncommon. Somewhat more are hired 
exclusively as teachers (usually at relatively low pay and with low job security). Most 
full-time, tenure track university faculty are expected both to teach and to do research. 
The latter, however, becomes the most readily marketed skill. The result is that though 
faculty are pulled in two ways, research performance is the primary basis for high 
mobility options and accordingly, relatively high salaries. Predictably, this has generated 
divisions within faculties, with those who do the majority of the undergraduate teaching 
                                                 
8 On the history of the American research university, see Geiger (1986, 1993). 
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often rewarded much less than those who do the majority of the research and publication. 
Add to this increasingly heavy reliance on graduate students as instructors, and one finds 
not only divisions within university communities, but the basis for a critique from 
students, parents, and outside constituencies. To many of the latter, it looks as though 
research-oriented faculty have feathered their nests at the expense of undergraduate 
students. Despite this, research universities remain very attractive to undergraduates, and 
many of the most talented in each year’s cohort of high school graduates choose research 
universities over liberal arts colleges in which they would receive more attention from 
faculty members, but where those faculty would be less well known researchers. 
It should be noted that although many more institutions declare their commitment 
to research, and attempt to gain financial resources for it, about 50 major universities 
account for the considerable majority of significant research (and large scale government 
and foundation funding). It is not at all clear what agendas are served by trying to hold 
faculty at all sorts of institutions to the standard of research productivity. Certainly it does 
result in increased publications, but most of these lack influence or significance in their 
fields.10 Faculty are not entirely irrational in this, however, for they know that publication 
is usually the best way to increase their value on the labor market (see Lewis 1996). 
 
Decentralization of educational policy.  Not only research, but the entire system 
of higher education is quite decentralized in the U.S. Federal policy direction is minimal. 
While federal funding is significant, it is far from dominant and in any case comes in 
diverse forms from a variety of agencies with different missions. The Department of 
Agriculture, the National Institutes of Health, and the Defense Department each, for 
example, contributes more to college and university budgets than the National Science 
Foundation or the Department of Education. It is the fifty states that are the primary 
sources of public funding for colleges and universities and that took the initiative in 
creating public higher education in America. The extent of their support varies. In some 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 For consideration of some of the tensions this hybridity produces, see the essays in Ehrenberg (1997). 
10 A separate question concerns what implications the dramatic increase in volume of publications may 
hold. It is already straining library resources. It may increase pressure to move away from traditional print 
publications towards electronic media. Certainly it makes it harder for individual scholars to cover the 
literature in any relatively broadly defined area. 
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cases, like Massachusetts, the private system preceded the public one and to some extent 
limited its development. In other cases, the state universities are as old as the states. The 
state universities of Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia vie for the distinction of being 
the oldest in the U.S. All are 18th century creations, some chartered in the very 
constitutions that created the states. In general, as one moves away from New England the 
role of the public institutions grows larger.  
A corollary to the very diversity of institutional forms, however, is the 
differentiation of sources of educational policy. Many American colleges and universities 
were founded by churches or other religious organizations—initially mostly Protestant 
but later also Catholic. While some have either shed their religious affiliations entirely, or 
come to be managed in largely secular fashion at arm’s length from denominational 
sponsors, others remain actively engaged in religious missions and their teaching is 
shaped accordingly. American colleges and universities are generally structured legally as 
autonomous or semi-autonomous corporations, with governance entrusted to a board of 
trustees. The latter may be selected by external bodies (as state legislatures name 
members to public university boards or religious organizations to those of church-
affiliated schools). Existing board members may name new ones from among 
benefactors, alumni, or public figures. In nearly all cases, a common feature is that boards 
of trustees mainly represent constituencies outside the faculty and current administration 
of the university. They draw in businesspeople, most prominently, lawyers and 
professionals, politicians and other public figures. There are occasionally but not always 
student representatives. Alumni are almost always represented. Although boards are not 
always interventionist, their composition symbolizes a conception of higher education 
institutions as directly responsive to broader constituencies and not self-sustaining 
creatures of their academic members.  
Boards then typically appoint a president as the chief executive officer of the 
university or college. The terminology of CEO is not accidental; the business imagery has 
become increasingly predominant, and reflects a shift in the function, peer group, and 
even background of presidents. These are mainly mediators between the university and its 
external constituencies: legislators, regulators, donors, and alumni (to the extent one 
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considers them external rather than internal). Many presidents now come from non-
academic careers in business or government, and they spend much of their time on the 
road. The University of Virginia board, for example, recently chastened its president. The 
latter had wanted to remain actively involved on campus and even to teach a course one 
semester a year. His board ordered him to spend more of his time on the road raising 
money and tending external constituencies.  
To handle internal affairs, presidents typically appoint a Chief Operating Officer, 
most often labeled a provost. This is the office at the apex of most academic policy-
making, though of course presidents are also involved, and most day-to-day decision-
making. Sometimes the provost is also designated Vice-President for Academic Affairs. 
In any case, alongside the provost (or the equivalent) there are apt to be several other vice 
presidents. The most powerful will be that in charge of business operations (ranging from 
the physical plant of the university to its financial management and contractual relations). 
There may also be vice-presidents of student affairs, community relations, and so forth. 
Under the vice-president for academic affairs or provost, there will be deans of various 
schools. The traditionally central one will be a college of arts and science (or something 
similar to this). This is the base of liberal arts undergraduate education, most PhD studies 
(though there may be a graduate school with a separate dean, the faculty will usually be 
appointed and departments governed through the arts and science college), and the vast 
majority of non-medical research. Increasingly, however, professional schools have 
become important and powerful, often able to raise substantial endowments of their own, 
to claim varying degrees of autonomy from the central administration, and to resist 
subsidizing the arts and sciences even though they do benefit from association with the 
university “brand” created by the core arts and science programs. Medical schools and 
health sciences are often extreme cases, and universities with substantial investments in 
the health area often have an entirely separate division to manage this, commonly with its 
own vice-president. This division may well include teaching hospitals, health 
management organizations, nursing care facilities and the like. Through most of the 
postwar era, medical schools commanded such large and growing fiscal resources that 
they were able to demand substantial autonomy. With reorganization of U.S. health care 
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in recent years, however, many have become fiscal drains or their host universities or at 
least more problematic to administer. Suffice it to say that I have barely scratched the 
surface of potential complexity in this and indeed in other aspects of governance.  
When it comes to research and the production of knowledge, decentralization and 
competition rule the system. The universities (and to much lesser extent, some colleges) 
compete with each other directly for funds to support research, and also for research-
based prestige that indirectly shapes funding for the future (not only by attracting grants 
but by attracting tuition-paying students and gifts from private benefactors). Even within 
each university, there is usually little central management of research priorities. This is 
somewhat less true where scientific projects with very large price tags are involved. The 
dominant pattern, however, decentralizes formal decision-making to departments or 
research centers. In fact, for most practical purposes, the decision-making is still more 
decentralized since administrators are seldom able to guide faculty research priorities 
effectively even if so inclined. For the most part, individual faculty or the heads of labs 
make decisions about what kinds of research to do and where to seek funds for their 
projects. They are evaluated on results, either in terms of publications and prestige or in 
terms of funding gained and financial proceeds. The university officials in charge of 
research serve as traffic police seeking to avoid collisions between different units of the 
same university seeking funding from the same source. 
 
Loyalty of Alumni.  Gifts to American colleges and universities come largely 
from graduates and their families. Alumni also sit on boards of trustees, and sometimes 
help to lobby legislatures on behalf of “alma mater”. Where one attended college (as even 
going to university is commonly called) is likely to be a lifelong source of identity and 
networks. This may be attenuated somewhat by the growing importance of higher 
education (typically pursued at a different institution) and by an increasing tendency to 
transfer among institutions during undergraduate degree programs. Nonetheless, alumni 
identification and loyalty remains extraordinary by European standards (with Oxford and 
Cambridge approximating it in the English system, and the grandes écoles in France, but 
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no overall European system producing or relying on it in the same general fashion). Three 
factors are probably crucial to this. 
First, secondary schools do not play comparable roles in elite formation or 
relational networks and identities generally. There is nothing like the lycée or gymnasium 
systems, nor like the old pre-comprehensive English system. American high schools have 
been overwhelmingly public for a long time, and attendance based mainly on residential 
location not selectivity. Neither is there a national examination system to judge secondary 
school achievement (and secondary school is perhaps the weakest link in the overall U.S. 
educational system). With a comparatively high percentage of 18-22 year olds attending 
college or university, this became the focal point for identity-formation, especially among 
elites.  
Second, the traditional American college education involves a residential 
experience. Although fewer American students share this experience as the scale of the 
system grows and more schools cater to commuters, it remains both large in absolute 
numbers and normative. It is basic to the American version of adolescence—again, 
especially for elites—and is celebrated in literature, TV, and film. This period of 
residence at college or university contributes to the development of strong identification, 
loyalty, and personal networks. It is also one of the key things that many middle and 
upper class parents are buying when they invest in a liberal arts education for their 
children. They are choosing a particular form of socialization. 
Third, perhaps comically to European ears but not trivially, American colleges 
and universities build loyalty through sports competition. Among those that are largely 
residential and especially those that are largely liberal arts in orientation, it is common to 
field teams in several sports. Some research universities field forty or more different 
teams in inter-school competition. College sports can be big business, with football and 
basketball programs especially able to bring in millions of dollars in annual revenue. In 
addition to ticket sales, they help colleges and universities to establish a “brand” which 
they market through the sale of commodities and as part of their recruitment of students. 
Perhaps above all, successful sports programs keep alumni involved, and make potential 
donors of them. The word “successful” is important, though; pity the college or university 
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president whose teams do not win. Coaches are often paid more than university presidents 
and in some cases presidents have found themselves unable to fire winning coaches, even 
when those were clearly guilty of recruiting or other infractions and had been publicly 
censured by national regulatory organizations. Athletes attend school on scholarships 
(especially in profit-making sports), and are commonly granted special consideration in 
admissions. Nearly all professional football and basketball players in the U.S., for 
example, played at the college level (though not all graduated) and commentary on 
television frequently makes reference to where they were undergraduates. 
 
Mobility of Faculty. European university professors have long moved from one 
center of learning to another, and indeed pioneered international exchanges of 
intellectuals long before the Erasmus scheme commemorated them. It is becoming 
increasingly common for faculty members to work outside their country of origin. 
Nonetheless, the European pattern has been for faculty appointments often to stay 
bounded not only by national but by regional and institutional origins. A large-scale 
market in university faculty is only now emerging in Europe. It is, by contrast, very much 
the norm in America.  
Indeed, one might say that the loyalty of alumni is complemented by disloyalty of 
faculty.11 These are rewarded primarily for publications and other achievements 
recognized within their academic disciplines or interdisciplinary fields. Accordingly, they 
turn their attention largely towards their standing in those fields, especially those that seek 
to compete in the upper reaches of the research university hierarchy. Outside offers are 
commonly the main condition for large pay raises. The result is not only that many 
professors are constantly looking for other jobs (whether they actually move or not) but 
that they are led to emphasis research activities that result in external recognition more 
than teaching and service work visible more on the local scene (see Lewis 1996). 
Mobility is highest among research-oriented faculty and especially those in research 
universities; more teaching-oriented faculty are less mobile (resulting in a reward 
problem for some institutions).  
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The pattern of mobility begins with “doctoral program exogamy”. That is, it is 
extremely uncommon for American departments to hire their own recent PhDs as new 
faculty. Americans praise this system for discouraging tendencies for departments to 
become ingrown, and encouraging not only intellectual dissemination and cross-
fertilization, but also productivity and high standards. It is not enough for graduates to be 
well-liked in their own departments; they must have achievements that make them 
marketable to others. Indeed, success in placing new PhDs is one of the most important 
status-markers for U.S. graduate departments. After initial placement, the tenure decision 
reached usually after five to seven years is the next major transition point. Delayed 
permanent employment, like doctoral program exogamy, is valued for promoting 
productivity and discouraging simply loyalty to those already within a departmental 
system. Standards for tenured positions have a tendency to vary with overall competition 
in the job market, however. Tenure was relatively easy to achieve in the 1960s; from the 
late 1970s to early 1990s, standards (or at least failure rates) were much higher. Few 
assistant professors could take promotion to associate professor with tenure for granted; 
many had to move at this stage; more than a few left academia. 12 Predictably, rates of 
rejection were highest at the most prestigious research universities. There has been some 
relaxation (varying by field) as the excess supply of strong faculty has declined. 
Nonetheless, tenure decisions remain points of major evaluation. Routine good 
performance is (at least in principle) insufficient for success. An unsuccessful review for 
tenure usually brings dismissal. It is rare for those dismissed to find new jobs at 
comparably prestigious institutions.  
By contrast, the appointment to full professorships is much more routine in the 
U.S. than in Europe. There is no similar tension over a long-term holding pattern where 
(as in Germany recently) an entire generation might wait years in indeterminate statuses 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 The same pattern holds also among senior academic administrators in the US, who if anything are more 
mobile than faculty. 
12 The American Association of University Professors sponsors a norm that “up or out” decisions should be 
reached within six years (allowing for one year of continued employment should decisions be unsuccessful). 
Tenure reviews are normally initiated in assistant professors’ fifth year or early in the sixth. A few 
universities, notably Harvard and Yale, tenure only full professors. Accordingly, they promote assistant 
professors to associate professorships with less rigorous scrutiny than other elite research universities (since 
tenure is not involved) but reviews for tenure are especially rigorous. 
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while waiting for their elders to vacate a more or less fixed number of chairs. Likewise, 
the American system removes faculty members from direct dependency on their seniors at 
a relatively early stage of career. Mobility remains common, though, as faculty members 
seek better appointments. This may mean bringing together groups of like-minded 
researchers. In other cases, faculty members move in search of autonomy. To some 
extent, the mobility of college professors mirrors the generally high rates of geographic 
and job mobility in the US.  
Above all, however, what replaces the European competition for chairs in the 
American system is a competition for money. This is often complemented by titles, but 
named professorships have proliferated to an extent that devalues them, and in any case 
few people will trade much real income for the prestige of a specially endowed 
professorship. What has resulted is a star system in which a small number of highly 
regarded and hence potentially highly mobile professors become the object of bidding 
wars. This began with the most famous senior faculty, but has extended even to new 
PhDs. Where there was in the past little salary competition for new assistant professors, 
universities are now prepared to vary salaries by several thousand dollars to win the stars 
of a particular cohort. Needless to say, being a star at such an early stage is the result of 
an especially unreliable (though self-reinforcing) process of social construction. The 
bidding wars become more common with approximately tenure stage faculty. Where 
fifteen to twenty years ago it may have been a narrow stratum gaining tenure, a larger 
proportion get tenure but a narrow stratum get to be the object of inter-institutional 
competition. The rewards can be huge—when one institutions sets out to poach an 
assistant professor from another, that individual can end up with early tenure, a salary 
nearly doubled, and extra research funds. At the full professor ranks, major salary 
increases come only from the threat of departure (whether immediate or more vaguely 
threatened). Some faculty members, however, operate under non-professional constraints, 
like two career marriages that limit their mobility. There are also obvious inequities based 
on the relative marketability of different specialties at different times. The star system 
results in huge salary differences within the same rank: some full professors are apt to 
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make twice as much as others in the same institution at approximately the same stage of 
career. Naturally, hard feelings are not in short supply. 
These bidding wars are not simply a result of a shortage of faculty; the star system 
results, rather, from a “winner take all” approach to rewards. Indeed, at the same time that 
the star system has become more prevalent and more expensive, there has been a 
substantial growth in the number of faculty members who work without long-term 
contracts, often in one-year temporary positions. Some are new PhDs who may soon get 
tenure-track positions—or else leave academia. A growing number of teachers remain 
without long-term contracts indefinitely, however, as universities use “adjunct” and other 
temporary appointments as a way of maintaining flexibility and cutting costs (see Martin 
1999).  
 
Breadth of ties to local communities.  While European universities certainly 
make a variety of contributions to the communities in which they are situated, this is 
distinctively a mandate for American institutions of higher education. This is another 
reflection of the general tendency for U.S. universities to reflect the heritage of guild 
autonomy less than European ones. Where they had a religious heritage, the mission it 
imparted was to train preachers; they did not evolve out of monasteries. More generally, 
they are called upon (often in their very charters) to be of service to their local 
communities. The pattern of their establishment—by local leaders and by state 
governments locating campuses in response to local political pressures—reinforced this.  
Community service can mean several different things (including educating the 
community’s youth). Probably its most visible form has been the provision of adult 
education programs. Partly because education has always been tied to a vision of social 
mobility in the U.S., demand for provision of practically oriented programs has long been 
large. It led to the development of continuing education programs and night schools. 
Universities helped to provide opportunities for immigrants. Their rapid growth was 
fueled by an openness to—even a drive to enroll—first generation college students. Some 
of these could study only part timer while working. It has generally been easier than in 
Europe for adults who did not start or left higher education programs earlier to re-enter 
 24 
the system. Many such adults simply enter regular course programs.13 In addition, 
colleges and universities have created a wide range of special programs for adults. Many 
of these were designed, at least initially, to offer “enrichment” rather than practical skills 
or credit toward degrees. A number of schools with core daytime programs for traditional 
college age students have gone into the potentially lucrative business of providing short-
term, evening, and weekend courses for adults. Many of these focus on specific career 
skills; others offer “seminars” aimed at cultural enrichment, self-help, spiritual 
fulfillment, avocational interests, etc.  In a few cases, these market-driven “extension” 
programs have become larger operations than the institutions’ original conventional 
degree programs.  
The very prominence of adult education and programs oriented to the practical 
concerns of local communities may have helped in recent years to facilitate the 
development of more for-profit higher education programs. While much of the attention 
to the recent rise of for-profit higher education has focused on new kinds of degree-
granting institutions, many programs are developments out of what were once service 
programs. Colleges and universities still structured as non-profit organizations—and 
often still oriented largely to their traditional campus constituencies--found that they 
could make money responding to markets for seminars, extensive courses, professional 
certificates, and distance learning.   
Beyond this, universities from early on took on other community-service tasks. 
The Morrill Act which created the “land-grant” universities provided many with a focus 
on agriculture and technology and a mandate to contribute to economic development. One 
of the most visible practical results was the university operation of agricultural extension 
services. Indeed, the fact that U.S. colleges and universities are much less likely to be in 
major cities may increase the prominence of this kind of contribution. Similarly, 
universities operate small business development centers, programs to educate and advise 
                                                 
13 The GI Bill after World War II was unusual in making older students central to a wide range of 
conventional academic programs. Most of the time, in most institutions, undergraduates are still primarily in 
their late teens or early twenties. The growth of graduate programs brings more mature students to colleges 
and universities. So do special programs designed to enhance specific job-related skills, with or without 
degree credit.  
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newly elected legislators, town councilors, and school board members. Colleges and 
universities also lend their space to a variety of autonomous community organizations. 
What all this means is that colleges and universities are often strongly integrated 
into the life of local communities. At the research universities this may be relatively 
formal, as in the operation of teaching hospitals. At smaller institutions it may be more 
informal. It creates in all cases a significant additional constituency for administrators to 
attend to. 
 
Emerging and Changing Issues in American Higher Education 
The American system of higher education has been shaped by recurrent structural 
transformations. Small colleges gave way to large universities; single campus universities 
grew into complex state systems; enrollments multiplied; students became more diverse. 
Another important restructuring is currently underway, and likely will prove a crucial 
phase in this longer-term history. In the remainder of this paper, I wish simply to call 
attention to some of the issues shaping change in the system. I will speculate on possible 
resolutions to these issues and directions of likely change, but it should be clear that these 
are only guesses. 
 
Tenure and employment security.  One of the biggest issues in American higher 
education is the division between relatively privileged and secure academics and those in 
more marginal jobs. Academia has, somewhat surprisingly, emerged as a prime example 
of a dual labor market. The situation of those with tenured appointments in well-funded 
institutions is markedly different from those lacking secure labor contracts, and also from 
those with some employment security but high teaching loads in relatively poorly funded 
institutions. The privileged elite unsurprisingly views its privileges as warranted—
protections of academic freedom allocated on a meritocratic basis. It is not clear, 
however, that all the privileges are sustainable (or desirable). 
First, while tenure has long been defended on grounds of academic freedom it is 
not clear that as presently structured it defends freedom very well, and it is clear that it 
empowers one class of academics at the expense of others. Calls for an end (or limits) to 
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tenure proliferated in the later 1980s and 1990s, but have faded with the current relatively 
strong job market. They are not likely to go away entirely, though, and may well gain 
wider force. Proposals to end or radically transform tenure have flourished recently partly 
because conservatives thought tenure was protecting left wing opinions, foolish political 
correctness, or the replacement of classics by cultural studies. This has encouraged many 
professors to dismiss them as merely ideological. It is worth recalling, however, that there 
are other reasons to reconsider the tenure system. 
Second, the abolition of mandatory retirement ages meant that tenured faculty 
could hang on to their positions indefinitely. While many may do their work well, this 
reduces entry-level positions for talented younger scholars. Tenure has become manifestly 
a system defending certain age cohorts at the expense of others.  
Third, this older professoriate was disproportionately white and male, which 
meant not only that it was harder for minorities and women to get in, but that when 
affirmative action measures were used they were more likely to provoke resentment 
because competition was limited to a reduced range of openings.14  
Fourth, the provision of tenure to one class of professors directly contributes to 
the marginalization of others. Not only do adjunct and other temporary faculty have none 
of the protection afforded tenured faculty, their numbers grow partly because the tenure 
system makes regular full-time appointments costlier, less flexible, and riskier.  
Fifth, it is widely acknowledged that there is little effective system of performance 
assessment in place for tenured faculty. While many institutions allocate merit raises on 
the basis of performance assessments, very few allocate work on such a basis, and still 
fewer have sufficient confidence in their systems to use them as bases for determining 
actual employment. In other words, in the absence of a retirement age, universities and 
colleges lack effective and fair criteria for determining when faculty members should be 
asked to step down.  
                                                 
14 One of the continuing obstacles to appointing more minority faculty—at least in the research 
universities—is that their records are compared primarily to their age-mates. The inflation of publication 
standards in an era of few jobs makes this a tough comparison. But hardly anyone is willing to admit the 
extent to which many minorities denied jobs because their research records were not “up to par” in fact have 
stronger records than already tenured faculty.   
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Sixth, calls to rethink tenure have also flourished because of the extraordinary 
freedom and opportunities for self-regulation afforded academics—at least those with 
tenure in relatively elite schools. It was (and remains) easy to find examples of scholars 
who do little teaching, no research, and much gardening—even while studies show that 
overall, academics work quite long hours. Colleges and universities added to the problem 
both by offering the public extremely poor explanations of what professors do, and by 
failing to implement effective systems of post-tenure review and continual performance 
monitoring.  
Seventh, the rise of university-industry partnerships and other market-driven 
components to the higher education system will put more pressure on assessment of 
actual faculty performance. It is also much harder to explain why researchers engaged in 
proprietary, for-profit research should be protected by tenure.  
Eighth, compared to the earlier institutions in which the academic freedom 
argument was classically developed, today’s American colleges and universities 
pioneered a less hierarchical structure of ranks (though not salaries) in which the range of 
protected “professors” was expanded to include a majority of teachers.  
Ninth, the growth and differentiation in American higher education discussed 
above meant that most faculty protected by tenure worked outside the elite institutions 
committed to the production and transmission of original knowledge and perspectives. 
Some of these issues are brought to the fore especially in periods of economic 
crisis or demographic pressure. At least between the late 1970s and mid-1990s, for 
example, tenure may actually have worked to inhibit free speech and intellectual 
diversity. It did this both by reducing the number of positions available for younger 
scholars, and by keeping young scholars on tenure track appointments under constant 
pressure to please their elders. The relative ease of gaining tenure during the rapid 
expansion of the 1960s and early 1970s exacerbated the problem by leaving in place an 
unusually large number of tenured scholars, many of whom had been chosen with 
relatively low selectivity. These scholars constituted a kind of demographic bulge 
blocking job opportunities and mobility for the large cohorts of talented graduate students 
attracted to many fields during the 1960s and 1970s. A downturn in employment 
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opportunities exacerbated this, turning many of the newer PhDs into a kind of enduring 
academic underclass. Members of this generation who considered themselves 
underplaced have constituted competition for new PhDs for twenty years. During the 
same period, simple financial pressures encouraged challenges to tenure at many 
institutions (famously Bennington in 1994).15  
Noting the problems with the existing tenure system does not mean that no 
protections of academic freedom and intellectual inquiry are needed. 16 On the contrary, 
growing pressures for accountability to extra-academic constituencies, and for market-
driven performance indicators both suggest that protections are needed. The question is 
whether it is best to defend the existing tenure system or develop some better, more 
equitable and flexible way of accomplishing similar goals. Keeping protections against 
dismissal for unpopular political views seems important. So, though with more 
qualifications, does protecting against dismissals that reflect short-term fluctuations in the 
popularity of different scholarly fields. Both of these can be addressed through good labor 
law, due process, and other institutional mechanisms as well as tenure.  
The growing prominence of adjunct and short-term faculty is already reducing the 
scope of coverage of the tenure system. Higher education has resisted neo-liberal erosions 
of job security more than many other industries, but it is certainly not immune. An 
economic downturn will put new pressure on the system. Even without a downturn, 
though, colleges and universities will continue their drives towards increasing 
productivity and efficiency.17 Willingly or under external pressure, more and more will 
adopt post-tenure reviews, and more of these will come to have real teeth. Which forms 
of faculty productivity they favor will be a matter of struggle and will vary among 
institutions.  
                                                 
15 Larger institutions were not immune. Under financial pressure in 1991, the University of California 
introduced not only economic incentives for retirement, but procedures that could lead to termination of 
tenure for low productivity faculty who did not volunteer. See Brubacher and Rudy (1997: 402-4). 
16 O’Brien (1997: ch. 3) offers a useful discussion of some of the background and arguments, and concludes 
that tenure is not a necessary condition of academic freedom. 
17 Institutions will continue to experience fiscal pressures, even in good economic times. Many of the 
factors that have already driven up costs will continue to do so. These include not only labor costs, but 
expenditures on libraries; physical plant; and laboratory facilities (for teaching as well as research). At the 
same time, competition for students will center partly on cost (in the form of scholarships at elite 
institutions, and directly in the form of tuition and fees at less elite ones).   
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Enrollment trends and career-orientations.  Overall enrollments will remain 
strong based on demographic momentum, but subject to economic cycles. There is no 
reason, however, to expect a return to the growth in resources and enrollments 
characteristic of the postwar period. Moreover, it is likely that for the foreseeable future, 
enrollment growth will be greatest in career-oriented subjects, not the liberal arts. This 
will place pressure on institutions to continue to adjust their curricular offerings. 
This will probably further distinctions among institutions. Less selective schools 
will be much more dramatically tied to economic factors. This means fluctuating 
enrollments (an incentive for administrators to continue to rely on temporary faculty). The 
shift toward courses sold on the basis of their job-market advantages will be widespread, 
but strongest in the least selective schools. If anything, job-related courses will become 
more clearly the staple offerings of most non-selective or minimally selective schools. An 
increase in adult students will bring some seeking liberal arts courses as “life 
enrichment,” but more seeking retraining to compete in the job market. 
Enrolments in predominantly liberal arts schools and curricula will be likely to 
remain approximately constant. The good news for advocates of the kinds of education 
they offer is that these schools are more shielded from economic pressures (directly on 
them and indirectly on students’ choice of fields). The bad news (for those same 
advocates) is that outside those schools liberal arts teaching will probably shrink and 
applied teaching grow. This is not the result of an intellectual crisis in the liberal arts, as 
some commentators have contended. The issue is better understood simply as a 
proportionate shift away from liberal arts towards career-oriented education, linked 
especially to expansion in the number of students going to college. It is indeed true that 
there have been declines in humanities enrollments, though this is not the evidence some 
conservative commentators claim for a rejection of new lines of scholarship. Indeed, the 
natural sciences and to a lesser extent the social sciences have also given way to other 
choices of majors (Turner and Bowen 1990; Oakley 1992).  
That the shift away from humanities and other liberal arts majors came in and 
after the late 1960s has led commentators to exaggerate political and content dimensions 
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and fail to grasp a key underlying dynamic. There was a dramatic growth in arts and 
sciences majors during the immediately preceding years of university expansion. 
Curricula at new schools largely mirrored those at older ones. Expanding campuses 
attempted to upgrade their status by upgrading the place of arts and sciences in their 
curricula. The increase was short-lived, however. Turner and Bowen (1990) cite Ball 
State University as an example. There arts and sciences degrees grew from 2.5% of the 
total in 1954 to 29.9% in 1970—before falling back to 13.3% in 1986.  
Third, commentators have missed a crucial difference between male and female 
enrollment patterns. Male enrollment in the humanities, for example, had already 
declined dramatically before the 1960s. This did not translate into significant effects on 
aggregate course enrollments because women were entering colleges and universities in 
growing numbers and disproportionately choosing humanities courses. Women’s choices 
of majors began to shift away from the humanities later than men’s; in the 1970s and 80s, 
women moved out of the humanities in a trend similar to that of men a generation earlier. 
This occurred largely because many professional careers became increasingly open to 
women, and women began to place more emphasis on preparation for employment. It 
resulted, however, in a specious conclusion about the “crisis of the humanities.” 
It is worthwhile, however, for social scientists to ponder this information with 
self-reflexivity. The movement of women into higher education but out of humanities 
majors has contributed to the “feminization” of social science—in all fields but 
economics undergraduate majors are now predominantly female, and graduate programs 
increasingly female. Will women move proportionately out of social sciences (other than 
economics) in coming years, as men have already done?  
 
Graduate Education.  Growth in graduate education is likely to continue. The 
growing prevalence of post-baccalaureate degrees is as a dramatic a development of the 
postwar years as the internal differentiation of undergraduate institutions and curricula. 
The majority of graduates of highly selective liberal arts colleges and universities now go 
on to graduate or professional school; there is every reason to expect that growth to 
continue. Grumbling about it—and its consequences—is also likely to continue. 
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Nonetheless, graduate education has emerged as just as much a normal stage of personal 
development today as undergraduate education was in the pre-war period. 
It is undergraduate education that defines the American public conception of both 
college and university. It the case of universities, however, graduate students are at least 
as basic to the character of campus life. Graduate education is, however, poorly 
understood.  In particular, there is little appreciation of why majors in arts and science 
subjects are not more closely tied to employment, leaving many students to seek either 
professional credentials or more advanced academic study in a research and/or scholarly 
field. This may reflect credentialism, but not only that. There have also been genuine 
increases in knowledge and in the skill bases for many lines of work. Much of the 
confusion has to do with the more general pattern of institutional differentiation that 
leaves schools pursuing different educational mandates under the common names 
“college” and “university.”  
Growth in graduate education is an important strategy for institutional reputation 
building, though it works differently at different levels of the status hierarchy. While 
adding master’s programs would do little to enhance the standing of the most elite and 
selective liberal arts colleges, it is a productive investment for many schools where 
applied majors dominate. The basic distinction lies between high status professional 
fields in which professional degrees are exclusively or primarily postgraduate, and lower 
status fields in which undergraduate credentials predominate (or in which college degrees 
are not required—yet). The elite liberal arts colleges offer relatively general educations 
that prepare students for specialization in high status professional schools or PhD 
programs (or for jobs that do not require highly specialized training or credentials, but 
that reward general learning, social status, and or networks). By contrast, less or non-
selective schools emphasize applied programs at the bachelor’s level (though of course 
they may also in varying proportion offer “arts and science” degrees the holders of which 
may seek entrance to elite professional or graduate schools). Some fields—notably 
business—straddle the distinction. By and large, the more elite and selective business 
schools avoid undergraduate instruction, and those on the way up have incentives to 
minimize their work with undergraduates. This leaves the field of undergraduate studies 
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in business largely open to less selective schools. The latter, in turn, have an incentive to 
develop graduate programs. This not only serves faculty interests, it may make 
undergraduate degrees more valuable and help to recruit students. The presence of a 
graduate program enables the school to develop better connections to employers, and 
makes it more likely that those who receive bachelor’s degrees will be able to claim a 
connection to people placed higher in the administrative hierarchies of prospective and 
actual employers.  
In the professional fields where undergraduate credentials remain prominent, there 
is apt to be a growing differentiation among practitioners that correlates with a growing 
role for graduate degrees. Development of graduate nursing programs, for example, 
reflects the expansion of nursing into new domains (e.g., clinical assessments for schools 
or courts), the growing proportion of nurses who work in large institutional settings rather 
than small clinics or patient’s homes, and the introduction of increased managerial and 
planning responsibility in the context of a changing health care system.  
With this in mind, it is worth stressing that the growth in graduate programs 
already represents a shift in their nature and further change is likely. PhD programs 
proliferated with an emphasis on training future American college faculty. This is not a 
growth area and has not been for decades; indeed, most major PhD granting institutions 
have demanded that department reduce the size of their PhD programs. Expansion has 
come and probably will continue to come in educating students for non-academic careers. 
The majority of graduate students, including PhD holders, will not become college 
teachers. This means that faculty members need to pay attention to the multiple career 
tracks for which we prepare students. As with so much else, this is likely to be reflected 
in a differentiation of institutional roles. Educating students as researchers is likely to 
remain the dominant strategy for those who wish to be among the most elite PhD 
programs. Expansion into applied research may grow, but expansion into non-research 
fields (e.g. marriage and family counseling) is likely to be rare. The elite graduate 
departments would do well to think explicitly about how they can best prepare students 
for jobs in selective liberal arts colleges—where research continues to flourish alongside 
a strong emphasis on undergraduate teaching. Development of applied programs outside 
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the research emphasis may take place more at other universities, and may offer them 
distinctive niches. In all settings, it is important to keep in mind that graduate education 
is—at least ideally—not simply “training,” but a much broader intellectual and scholarly 
enterprise. Students are not simply developing technical skills; this may be more or less 
important depending on their career aspirations. They are continuing an education.  
 
Internationalization.  The internationalization of American higher education will 
continue. There may be debate about how to understand increasing global integration, but 
there can be little doubt that it is a basic fact of life in the contemporary world. Barring 
the catastrophic scenarios of science fiction novels, there is good reason to think that 
global integration will continue to grow in the next century as it has in the last five.  
Close to half a million international students study in U.S. colleges and 
universities.18 This does not include foreign born residents of the U.S., who have become 
a rapidly growing proportion of the student population. Both groups are distributed 
unevenly among schools—close to 10% of all foreign students attend colleges and 
universities in metropolitan New York. In general, foreign students are more prominent at 
schools in large metropolitan areas—but attend a wide variety of kinds of schools in those 
areas. Courses need to change not only to better educate these students, but to better take 
advantage of the diversity their presence brings to classrooms. Much of the growth in 
international students has been in graduate students, and this of course also calls for 
attention. Too many programs have been slow to meet the interests of the students they 
attract; too many treat international students as a separate category, subject to different 
expectations and monitored for signs as to whether they will return to their home 
countries after graduation or make careers in the U.S. Many do the latter, of course, and 
contribute to a growing presence of international faculty in American colleges and 
universities. This too is a transformation with implications for teaching. These faculty 
have much to contribute, but both employing schools and students are ambivalent about 
them. 
                                                 
18 457,984 in 1996-97, according the Institute for International Education. This is an increase of about 1% 
over the year before. The most rapid growth in numbers of foreign students took place in the 1980s. The 
recent crisis of Asian economies may actually reduce the numbers—but probably only temporarily.  
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The flow of students in the other direction is also important. Some 89,000 
American students studied abroad in 1995-96. Study abroad programs, however, are 
prominent only among students at the more selective colleges and universities. This is 
partly a reflection of students’ aspirations and choice of courses of study, but also largely 
shaped by financial resources.19 This suggests all the more need to bring international 
content into a wide range of sociological teaching. Study abroad is growing and 
increasingly being encouraged in liberal arts programs (and in a few more applied 
programs, mainly at selective schools). A weak link, however, is the development of 
opportunities for returning study abroad students to integrate their international 
experiences into their curricula, to reflect on what they learned and see it in intellectually 
deeper ways. Students evaluate study abroad experiences extremely favorably, but except 
for language majors these remain largely cut off from the rest of what they do in school, 
and “re-entry” is sometimes a let down. 
The internationalization of higher education is also a matter of growing linkages 
in the production of knowledge itself. Faculty members communicate with and 
collaborate with colleagues around the world. There is a continuous flow of faculty 
among countries (with the U.S. disproportionately a receiver). In the humanities and 
social sciences, especially, increasingly internationalization of intellectual life must at 
least encourage if not force some changes in its content. U.S. social science, for example, 
has often been relatively ethnocentric. Its very scale allows it to remain somewhat insular, 
absorbing only those parts of the global production of knowledge most consonant with its 
existing patterns. This is a significant weakness, and one likely to become increasingly 
apparent. 
 
 Diversity.  Overall student populations will continue to grow more diverse; a key 
question is how much students of different backgrounds will be segmented into different 
educational institutions and tracks. As college and university education has become less 
                                                 
19 The financial resources in question include not only those of the student and his or her parents, but those 
of the school itself. Operating study abroad programs is expensive; encouraging students to attend programs 
operated by others and transfer credit means losing tuition revenue. It should also be noted that the impact 
of class on study abroad is not limited to financial resources, but includes the effect of parents’ “cultural 
capital,” including whether they have traveled abroad, are aware of international issues, etc. 
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exclusively the prerogative of an elite, as women have been included in growing 
numbers, and as religious and racial exclusions have been eliminated, student bodies have 
become more heterogeneous. This has been true on almost every campus, but diversity 
has also been unevenly distributed among campuses. Children of immigrants, for 
example, are much more heavily represented in community colleges. The changes reflect 
not only higher education policies but changes in the demography and stratification of 
American society.  
Increasing enrolments of students outside dominant groups has brought recurrent 
resentments—whether the newly admitted or expanding groups were Jews, Blacks, 
Asians, or women. The affirmative action policies adopted in and after the 1960s have 
produced especially widespread resentment and criticism—including from some of their 
intended (and actual) beneficiaries. In the late 1990s, attacks on such programs began to 
enjoy more success in courts and referenda. It seems likely that the extent of affirmative 
action in college and university admissions will be reduced. Certainly in some states such 
as California, dramatic changes in policy have been adopted. It is not likely that there will 
be an even rollback to such programs, however, but rather that the level of effort made to 
attract various minorities will vary from school to school and state to state.  
Cutbacks in affirmative action will most adversely affect Blacks and Hispanics. 
They will benefit Whites and Asians—and in states with large Asian populations will 
benefit Asians most.20 The main impact will not be on the overall numbers of each group 
attending college, however, but on which colleges they attend. Where affirmative action 
is relaxed, the most selective schools will become more White and Asian, the less 
selective more Black and Hispanic.21 The impact will probably be greater on public 
schools than on private. The impact is likely to be more extreme in some states, like 
California. In general, it will work to increase the implications of the differentiation of 
institutions we have already noted. 
                                                 
20 California is the paradigm for this. It should be noted, though, that “Asian” is not a single and internally 
homogenous category. Asian groups vary in their economic standing and in the extent to which their 
children will benefit from admissions policies emphasizing grades and test scores alone. 
21 For an indication that affirmative action at the country’s most selective schools has made a difference, see 
Bowen and Bok (1998).  
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Whatever happens with affirmative action, however, diversity is likely to grow—
and to grow even at highly selective schools. This does not mean that it will involve all 
groups equally; on the contrary, Hispanics and Blacks are likely to suffer from growing 
disparities in educational attainment. High levels of immigration during the last decade 
are the key reason why there will be growing diversity of student populations. Large 
absolute numbers are reinforced by the relatively young age of most immigrants and the 
relatively high fertility of immigrants (and non-immigrant minorities). Teachers will need 
to be attentive to the different backgrounds and interests of a much wider range of groups 
than were present in American higher education even a couple of decades ago. Already 
teachers in major metropolitan areas are dealing with such changes in student bodies. 
Recent immigrants figure especially prominently in community colleges and some public 
4-year schools. These are attractive not only because of low cost and open admissions, 
but because of programs that meet these students’ needs and convenience for living at 
home (which many such students and/or their families prefer). Wherever minority 
students are, there will also be demand for teaching that bears directly on the 
distinctiveness of their lives and communities.22 
The goal of having faculty populations broadly reflect the composition of student 
bodies is becoming even harder to attain. This is likely to be a source of continuing 
controversy. The problem is not that there are few talented members of minority groups, 
but that there are many such minority groups. Asian students may think it a good thing to 
have Black and Hispanic as well as white faculty, for example, but it hardly overcomes a 
lack of Asian faculty. South Asian students may feel poorly represented by Chinese 
faculty members though both are “Asian.” Pakistani and Indian students may not feel 
equally well represented by faculty members of either national background (and as the 
example suggests, religion is likely to play a role—uncomfortable for many American 
sociologists—alongside race, language, and national origin). Many of these are also 
categories of potential faculty that current department members—even those favorable to 
affirmative action for Blacks--have a hard time conceptualizing as important for 
increasing diversity and representativeness. To this, add the question of whether women 
                                                 
22 Such teaching may, in fact, be one of the most important exceptions to the tendency for “applied” courses 
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of ethnic and racial minorities are hired as often as men.  In any case, more different 
minority group members will compete (with each other as well as with whites) for open 
positions. Foreign students figure in some groups, such as Asians, alongside immigrant or 
long-time Americans. Many such groups are coming to be prominent in graduate student 
populations, while still poorly represented in faculty positions. 
 
Disciplines and interdisciplinarity. Within colleges and universities, there will 
be opportunities to achieve stronger intellectual communities across disciplinary 
divisions, but there will also be resistance. One of the great changes in higher education 
institutions has been a reduction in the embeddedness and membership of each individual 
faculty member in his or her home institution. This has come partly as a result of growth 
in scale. It has come largely as a result of inter-institutional mobility. As faculty members 
move from school to school, they have reduced cross-unit ties within each school. A 
crucial dimension of all of this is the development of highly distinct academic disciplines. 
This is not just—or perhaps even crucially—a matter of intellectual distinctions (Calhoun 
1992). It is a matter of power and turf control. It is also largely a matter of the creation of 
sociometric universes within which reputations and careers are formed. 
Different disciplines are supported by separate professional associations, scholarly 
journals, and periodic conventions. There are also interdisciplinary associations, journals, 
and conventions. These typically play smaller roles in job markets but they are not 
altogether different. As we discussed above, the rising importance of research facilitated 
the creation of supralocal job markets and career opportunities. These are of greatest 
importance, not surprisingly, for those scholars and institutions that most emphasize 
research. The more invested academics are in research, the greater their opportunities for 
mobility and the more differentiated their career patterns are likely to be. At the same 
time, the proliferation of temporary faculty also works against the construction of strong 
intellectual community.   
Among the impacts of this pattern is a strong compartmentalization of intellectual 
life. Not only are disciplines demarcated intellectual in-groups suspicious of outsiders, so 
                                                                                                                                                 
to dominate in less elite schools.  
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are many subdisciplines. The jokes about scholars knowing more and more about less and 
less have bite. Specialization is a path to certain forms of success. It is, however, a path 
antithetical to strong local intellectual community. It also encourages a differentiation—
and sometimes even an alienation--of teaching scholars—especially those focused mainly 
on undergraduates—from those playing the most powerful roles in the elite research 
institutions.  
Continuing reductions in research funding, especially government support for 
scholar-initiated “basic science”, will narrow the range of schools and the range of 
scholars that can depend heavily on this kind of research. Most other schools and scholars 
will have greater reasons to strengthen their local ties. Proprietary research has grown 
rapidly, though only minimally in sociology. Where this is rooted in local university-
industry connections rather than the discrete funding of individual scholars’ research, this 
enhances local ties. Growth in applied research also furthers local ties, and is frequently 
less closely controlled by disciplinary concerns than is “basic science”. Last but not least, 
as government funding is cut and tied to special programs, foundations play a larger role. 
These, however, are seldom set up on disciplinary bases and commonly set up their 
programs on the basis of cross-cutting thematic concerns. Ease of long-distance 
communication—e.g. by email and Internet—also facilitates formation of cross-
disciplinary subgroups. As more graduate students seek employment outside universities, 
the hold of disciplines on them (and thus on those who pay for their education and 
employ their teachers) may be reduced. Two-career couples have become more prominent 
and geographic mobility is harder for them.  
Among the implications of low levels of local interdisciplinary ties is a tendency 
for teachers in any one field to know relatively little about what their students are 
studying in other departments. A valid—though not altogether novel—criticism of 
contemporary college educations is that there is little coherence to the overall package of 
courses a student takes, and there are few opportunities for students to reflect on how the 
whole fits together. Instructors who have weak knowledge of and ties to colleagues in 
other fields are poorly placed to help students make the relevant connections. Colleges 
and universities have recently responded to this line of criticism with a renewed emphasis 
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on interdisciplinary general education at the “foundations” level and on “capstone” 
courses, usually within majors, at the immediate pregraduation stage. The latter have 
commonly been disciplinary, and often oriented especially towards students continuing 
toward disciplinary graduate programs. Some, however, have addressed the needs of 
students headed towards post-baccalaureate professional schools or making the transition 
from college to employment. There remains, however, a tension between the strong 
interdisciplinary interests of many students and the extent to which disciplines continue to 
control the turf of academic employment.  
Intense competition over research “stars” on the part of elite graduate institutions 
is likely to continue. This will lead to more inter-institutional mobility and reductions in 
local integration across disciplines in those institutions. The more open the job market, 
the greater will be the reward attaching to disciplinary prestige compared to local cross-
unit ties. On the other hand, many “stars” are hired on the basis of interdisciplinary 
reputations and engagements. In many universities, moreover, disciplinary departments 
are the primary defenders of the status quo. Conservative against most forms of change 
(except growth in their own resources), they resist curricular reform, the introduction of 
new fields, investment in interdisciplinary scholarship and teaching—even when these are 
intellectually exciting and/or attractive to students.  
 
New Technology. The combination of new technology (especially the Internet) 
and increasingly market-driven higher education will challenge some traditional 
institutions and encourage the creation of new kinds of institutions. It is too early to tell 
what the overall results of these changes will be, but the magnitude is much greater than 
most American college professors realize.  
It is unlikely that new technologies or orientations to the market will undo the 
dominance of elite research universities in American higher education. Of course, these 
institutions will enter some parts of the new markets and will use the new technologies in 
ways that change how they work. The biggest challenge to the research universities, 
though, comes not in their core activities but in the question of whether they will lose or 
transform some lucrative sideline activities. Internet provision and new kinds of 
 40 
marketing are transforming continuing education, for example. This has been a relatively 
easy to organize "cash cow" for many universities. This is now becoming less of a cottage 
industry and more of a nationally organized market, complete with for-profit firms 
managed more efficiently than universities generally are and backed by venture capital. 
Some research universities will likely use their “brand names” to occupy premium 
positions in the new market—indeed, several have already organized market-driven and 
sometimes explicitly for-profit subsidiaries to do so. Others will likely suffer a loss of 
income as their implicitly for-profit subsidiaries succumb to more efficiently organized or 
better-marketed competition. 
Outside the research universities, the new technology and market-driven 
institutions may challenge more of the traditional core activities of colleges and 
universities. To the extent that these did not provide residential experiences, rich arrays of 
extracurricular activities, personal attention, and direct contact with intellectual active 
faculty, they have less to distinguish themselves in competition. This competition may 
come from completely new entrants into the educational market, or from existing 
educational institutions that choose radically to expand their market share. At present, the 
new entrants are largely confined to the development of specialized niches (such as parts 
of business and technology education) and to recruitment of part-time students who 
would not necessarily enter higher education otherwise. They compete mainly with 
continuing education programs if they compete with existing schools. This is likely to 
change, however, and to change fairly fast. There is no intrinsic reason why higher 
education (particularly outside its most elite bastions) cannot be subjected to the rigors of 
market competition—including rationalization, standardization, and economies of scale—
just as much as other service industries. 
The competition may be felt most acutely by branch campuses of state universities 
and small colleges no longer focused on the liberal arts. Some of these will adapt, 
probably often by forming alliances with larger-scale organizations that develop and 
market curricula. They will provide face-to-face contact as a complement to distance 
learning. Two year schools will also face a challenge, particularly because hey have 
expanded in recent years often by making inroads into exactly the sectors now most 
 41 
eagerly pursued by for-profit and Internet-based providers. Even liberal arts colleges, 
perhaps the most distinctively American of all higher education institutions, will feel the 
pinch. Indeed, as we noted, their numbers have already declined faced with competition 
from other kinds of institutions. It is likely that they will survive mainly where they can 
market attractive socialization experiences to their students. Their numbers may be 
reduced, but many American parents—and students--will continue to want the kind of 
personal attention and community environment they can offer. 
 
Conclusion 
 I have suggested that perhaps the single most salient feature of American higher 
education is the enormous differentiation among institutions. Different in form, function, 
size, mandate, prestige, selectivity, and resources, colleges and universities nonetheless 
project a surprisingly common and confused public image. This has contributed to a lack 
of clarity among funders, students, and critics of various perspectives. But despite the 
confusions, American higher education is also enormously vital and impressively 
successful in meeting the needs of a very wide range of students and of other 
constituencies such as purchasers of research. The diversity of institutions is a crucial 
basis for this vitality. 
 I have also argued that poorly recognized transformations in institutional patterns 
and student enrolments have dramatically altered teaching and academic employment in 
the postwar era. Changes in who is enrolled in higher education, and in the kinds of 
institutions that enroll them, account for many differences in the overall field of higher 
education that are poorly perceived as declines. But these changes also demand that those 
who would improve teaching and learning take seriously the differences among the 
environments in which these occur, and the student populations with which different 
teachers work. A populist tendency to mask the structural and cultural differences behind 
the words “college,” “university,” and “professor” makes this hard to accomplish. 
 Changes continue. Some are welcome, others not. Those who would learn from 
the American experience need to do more than simply grasp traditional or current patterns 
well. They need also to watch how American institutions meet the new challenges they 
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face, and how different kinds of institutions fare in a changing environment. Those who 
would emulate specific features of American higher education need to pay attention to 
their integration into a larger system and the potential for ‘disfunctions’ or 
disappointments when they are taken out of context.  
 
References 
 
Bloom, Allan 1987 The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has 
Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today’s Students. New York: 
Harper Touchstone. 
Bowen, William and Derek Bok  1998  The Shape of the River: Long-term Consequences 
of Considering Race in College and University Admissions. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Breneman, David W. 1990 “Are We Losing Our Liberal Arts Colleges?” The College 
Board Review, No. 150 (Summer), pp. 16-29. 
Brint, Steven and Jerome Karabel (1988) The Dream Deferred. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Brubacher, John S. and Willis Rudy 1997 Higher Education in Transition: A History 
of American Colleges and Universities.  New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers. 
Calhoun, Craig  1992 "Sociology, Other Disciplines, and the Project of a General 
Understanding of Social Life," pp. 137-195 in T. Halliday and M. Janowitz, eds.  
Sociology and its Publics.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press. 
Calhoun, Craig 1999a  “The Changing Character of College: Institutional Transformation 
in American Higher Education,” pp. 9-31 in Bernice A. Pescasolido and Ronald 
Aminzade, eds., The Social Worlds of Higher Education. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Pine Forge Books. 
Calhoun, Craig 1999b  “Continuing Trends or Future Transformations,” pp. 548-562 in 
Bernice A. Pescasolido and Ronald Aminzade, eds., The Social Worlds of Higher 
Education. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Books. 
 43 
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 1972 A Statistical Portrait of Higher 
Education. Berkeley, CA: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. 
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 1987 A Classification of Institutions of 
Higher Education. Princeton: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching. 
Cohen, A. M.  1998  The Shaping of American Higher Education. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass. 
D’Souza, Dinesh 1991 Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on 
Campus. New York: Vintage 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G., ed.  1997  The American University: National Treasure or 
Endangered Species. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   
Geiger, R.L.  1986  To Advance Knowledge: The Growth of the American Research 
University, 1900-1940. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Geiger, R.L.  1993  Research and Relevant Knowledge: The Research Universities since 
World War II. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Kimball, Roger 1990 Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Higher 
Education. New York: Harper Collins  
Lewis, Lionel S. 1996 Marginal Worth: Teaching and the Academic Labor 
Market.  New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
Lucas, Christopher J.  1996 Crisis in the Academy: Rethinking Higher Education in 
America.  New York: St. Martins Press. 
Marsden, George 1994 The Soul of the American University: From Protestant 
Establishment to Established Nonbelief. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Martin, Randy 1999 Chalk Lines: The Politics of Work in the Managed University. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
McClelland, Charles M. 1980 State, Society, and University in Germany: 1700-
1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
National Center for Educational Statistics 1996 Digest of Educational Statistics.  
Washington: U.S. Department of Education. 
 44 
National Center for Educational Statistics 1997 The Condition of Education. 
Washington: U.S. Department of Education. 
Oakley, Francis 1992 Community of Learning: The American College and the 
Liberal Arts Tradition. New York: Oxford University Press. 
O’Brien, George Dennis 1997 All the Essential Half-Truths about Higher 
Education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ottinger, Cecily A., ed. 1989 Higher Education Today: Facts in Brief. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education. 
Pescasolido, Bernice and Ronald Aminzade, eds.  1999 The Social Worlds of Higher 
Education. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Books. 
Rashdall, Hastings 1936 The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, 3 vols. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rothblatt, Sheldon and Bjorn Wittrock, eds.  1993 The European and American 
University since 1800: Historical and Sociological Essays. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Slaughter, Sheila and Larry L. Leslie 1997 Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and 
the Entrepreneurial University. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
Schmidt, Benno, et al. 1999 A System in Crisis: Report on the CUNY System. 
Smith, Page 1990 Killing the Spirit: Higher Education in America. New York: 
Viking. 
Sykes, Charles T. 1990 ProfScam: Professors and the Demise of Higher Education.  
New York: St. Martins. 
Turner, Sarah E. and William G. Bowen 1990 “The Flight from the Arts and 
Sciences: Trends in Degrees Conferred,” Science, 250 (26 Oct.), pp. 517-21. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census 1976 Historical Statistics of the United States, 2 vols. 
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Veysey, Lawrence, R. 1965 The Emergence of the American University.  Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  
 
 
